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ABSTRACT
Social Network Sites (SNSs) like Facebook or Instagram are spaces
where people expose their lives to wide and diverse audiences. This
practice can lead to unwanted incidents such as reputation damage,
job loss or harassment when pieces of private information reach
unintended recipients. As a consequence, users often regret to have
posted private information in these platforms and proceed to delete
such content after having a negative experience. Risk awareness is
a strategy that can be used to persuade users towards safer privacy
decisions. However, many risk awareness technologies for SNSs
assume that information about risks is retrieved andmeasured by an
expert in the field. Consequently, risk estimation is an activity that is
often passed over despite its importance. In this work we introduce
an approach that employs deleted posts as risk information vehicles
to measure the frequency and consequence level of self-disclosure
patterns in SNSs. In this method, consequence is reported by the
users through an ordinal scale and used later on to compute a risk
criticality index. We thereupon show how this index can serve in
the design of adaptive privacy nudges for SNSs.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Privacy protections; Social aspects
of security and privacy; Usability in security and privacy; • In-
formation systems→ Users and interactive retrieval; • Human-
centered computing→ Human computer interaction (HCI);
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
Social Network Sites (SNSs) like Facebook or Twitter allow users
to create and maintain social connections with a wide spectrum
of online communities which represent (in many cases) the differ-
ent facets of their lives. User-generated content plays a major role
in this process since posts, comments, videos and photos are the
vehicles that allow users to relate with each other within these plat-
forms. Nevertheless, disclosing private and sensitive information
through these communication channels can result in unwanted
incidents such as reputation damage, unjustified discrimination or
even job loss when such content reaches an unintended audience
[1, 23]. Consequently, users very often regret having posted private
information in SNSs because they were unable to anticipate the
negative consequences of their actions [23].
Risk awareness is key for making better and more informed
decisions in our daily lives. For instance, being aware of the risks
of smoking can discourage people in engaging with tobacco con-
sumption [10]. Likewise, nutrition labels can support people in
improving their eating habits [7]. However, users of SNSs receive
very little (for not saying none) information about the risk of on-
line interaction, neither as part of the platform’s layout nor in the
body of the privacy policy [5]. Moreover, SNSs very often present
themselves as spheres free of intrusions and privacy risks. This lack
of information modulates the perceived severity of privacy risks in
favour of information disclosure and, consequently, in benefit of
the service providers [19, 22].
Privacy scholars have developed a wide variety of preventative
technologies [4, 9, 24] to induce changes in the privacy decisions
made by the users of SNSs. For instance, these technologies pro-
vide cues about the semantics of the content being shared by the
users (i.e. if a post contains private information or not) in order to
persuade them towards safer privacy practices [5]. Such approach
can be improved by personalizing these cues with risk information
associated with self-disclosure patterns in SNSs [4, 21]. That is, pro-
viding a personalised assessment of the risks that may take place if
private information is revealed in a post. A prerequisite to perform
this task is to have a repository of unwanted incidents, together
with their respective frequencies and severity levels [6]. However
-to the best of our knowledge-, not many efforts have been made
on defining the necessary mechanisms to collect and process such
information. In other words, the information necessary to gener-
ate a proper risk estimation often remains as an assumption for
preventative technologies.
In this work, we introduce a method to estimate the risks of
information disclosure in SNSs using deleted posts as indicators of
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online regrets. Since users often delete their publications after liv-
ing a negative experience in SNSs [23], we propose to leverage such
deleted content to (i) retrieve information about unwanted inci-
dents, and (ii) estimate their respective frequency and consequence
level. For this purpose, we introduce an interface for collecting
this information in which the perceived consequence level of the
incidents can be entered by the users using nominal values (i.e. cata-
strophic, major, moderate, minor and insignificant). In line with this,
we describe how this information can be used later on to compute
a risk criticality index and integrate it into an adaptive awareness
mechanism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section
we discuss related work in the area of adaptive privacy awareness.
Following, section 3 introduces the theoretical foundations of this
paper. In particular, we discuss the use of heuristics for the genera-
tion of awareness together with a risk estimation approach. Section
4 elaborates on a method for collecting evidence of recurrent un-
wanted incidents in SNSs using deleted posts as risk-information
vehicles. Next, section 5 introduces an algorithm for the genera-
tion of adaptive privacy awareness. This algorithm combines the
output produced by the method of section 4 together with the risk
index introduced in section 3. Following, section 6 analyses the
strengths and limitations of our approach, and section 7 describes
the corresponding design and evaluation plan. Finally, in section
8 we outline the conclusions of this paper and give directions for
future work.
2 RELATEDWORK
Privacy in SNSs is a multifaceted issue that has caught the atten-
tion of many researchers across different disciplines [3]. In the
particular case of online self-disclosure, several Preventative Tech-
nologies (PTs) have been proposed for nudging the users towards
a safer privacy behavior [5]. Basically, PTs generate interventions
(i.e. warning messages or suggestions) when users attempt to pub-
lish private or sensitive information in their profiles [5]. This way,
users are induced to reflect on the content they are about to share
and the negative consequences that may occur after posting such
content. Although this is a well-grounded persuasive strategy, warn-
ings are sometimes perceived as too invasive or annoying by the
users. This happens basically because not all users have the same
privacy attitudes or concerns and, consequently, adopt different
privacy strategies [20]. For instance, some users are more willing
to disclose private information without much concern about the
consequences, and others rather keep such information away from
unwanted recipients. This suggests that PTs should generate in-
terventions aligned with the users’ privacy attitudes in order to
engage them in a continuous learning process [6]. In other words,
PTs should incorporate adaptivity principles into their design.
At a glance, the adaptive awareness process of PTs can be de-
scribed as a loop consisting of two main activities as shown in
Fig. 1. In the first step, knowledge extraction, the information that is
necessary for the generation of adaptive interventions is gathered
and stored inside a Knowledge Base (KB). The second step, knowl-
edge application, consists of querying the information inside the
KB to shape personalized interventions. This two-phase process
repeats itself after some time in order to update the information
inside the KB and thereby improve the quality of the interventions.
For instance, Misra et al. [15] developed an approach in which
the emerging communities inside a user’s ego network (i.e. the
network of connections between his/her friends) is used to build
personalized access-control lists (i.e. black lists of information re-
cipients). In this case, knowledge extraction consists of retrieving
the user’s ego-network, and knowledge application involves the
use of this information for generating a personalized access-control
list. This process repeats itself when the topology of the user’s
ego-network changes (i.e. when contacts or links between contacts
are added/removed).
Figure 1: Adaptive Privacy Loop
Combining adaptive awareness with risk management features is
a promising approach for promoting safer privacy decisions among
the users of SNSs. As mentioned by Díaz Ferreyra et al. [6] and
Acquisti et al. [19], information about the potential risks of a self-
disclosure act can nudge the users towards more proactive privacy
decisions. In line with this premise (i.e. more risk information,
better privacy decisions), De et al. [2] developed an approach using
attack-trees to inform the users of SNSs about the privacy risks
that may result from their privacy settings (e.g. the risks of having
a public profile). Despite its novelty, assumptions were made with
regard to the information used for the estimation of such risks. This
is, a prerequisite for the application of this approach is to have a KB
containing information about common unwanted incidents, their
frequency and consequence levels. In order to endow this and other
PTs with the information necessary for computing privacy risks,
we propose a method for collecting such risk-related information
using deleted posts. Likewise, we describe how this information
can be aggregated and used to define an adaptive mechanism of
risk awareness.
3 BACKGROUND
In this section we introduce the theoretical foundations of this
paper. Particularly, we discuss how regrettable online experiences
can be translated into patterns of information disclosure and used
thereafter for the generation of privacy awareness inside SNSs. In
line with this, we discuss the importance that the estimation of risk
values has for PTs and introduce an approach that can be used to
carry on with this task.
3.1 Privacy Heuristics
A privacy regret in SNSs can be defined as a “feeling of sadness,
repentance or disappointment which occurs when a piece of sensi-
tive information reaches an unintended audience and results in an
unwanted incident” [6]. For instance, the regrettable scenario of
Fig. 2 illustrates a situation in which a user gets in trouble with
her employer after posting a negative comment about her work-
place. Probably, this scenario might have been experienced by more
than one user while interacting inside a SNS. In this case, such
scenario can be abstracted into a pattern of information disclosure
that represents this and other regrettable scenarios with similar
characteristics. Diaz Ferreyra et al. [6] propose to describe recurrent
self-disclosure scenarios using privacy heuristics (PHs). Basically,
PHs model patterns of information disclosure as a tuple <PAs, Au-
dience, Risk> where PAs is a set of private attributes, Audience is a
collection of recipients (e.g. Facebook friends), and Risk is a char-
acterization of the severity (i.e. a measure of the consequence and
frequency) of an Unwanted Incident (UIN). Hence, the correspond-
ing PH for the scenario of Fig. 2 models the severity of job loss
when a negative comment about ones’ workplace is disclosed to an
audience composed by work colleagues.
The knowledge inside PHs can be used by PTs to communicate
the risks associated with disclosing certain patterns of private infor-
mation in SNSs. This can be done by checking the Risk information
inside a PH whose PAs match with the ones disclosed in a new post
[6]. For instance, if the same user of Fig. 2 (or any other user) at-
tempts to disclose a negative comment about her workplace inside
a new post, the PT could inform her that this can lead to job loss if
seen by her work colleagues. This information flow corresponds to
the knowledge application step described in Fig. 1 for a PT whose
KB consists of a collection of PHs. Such a Privacy Heuristics Data
Base (PHDB) can be engineered through the elicitation of regret-
table scenarios and their later encoding into PHs [4, 6]. In principle,
one could shape a PH out of the experience of a single user (e.g.
extracting the PAs, the Audience and the Risks in a face-to face
interview or through an online questionnaire) [4]. However, the
consequence level of an UIN is subjective (i.e. varies from individual
to individual) and the same UIN can be perceived as insignificant by
one user and catastrophic by others. Moreover, a single occurrence
of an UIN is not enough to estimate its frequency. Therefore, one
must have multiple sources of evidence of an UIN to generate a
good risk estimator.
USER’S POST
“A typical day at the office. Lots of complaints and
bad mood. Cannot wait for the day to be over...!”
Actual Audience: PUBLIC.
Unintended Audience: The user’s work colleagues.
Unwanted Incidents: Reputation damage; job loss.
Figure 2: Example of self-disclosure scenario
3.2 Criticality Index
Estimating the severity of privacy risks is an important step towards
the generation of privacy awareness. Basically, this allows to prior-
itize the communication of those risks with a high severity level
over those risks whose severity level is low. One way to estimate
such risk levels is through a risk index that aggregates instances of
elementary risk evidence measured through quantitative or qual-
itative data [8]. Since ordinal scales such as insignificant, minor,
moderate, major and catastrophic are convenient when measuring
the consequence of unwanted incidents [14], it is desirable that a
risk index can deal with ordinal variables. One approach that takes
this aspect into account is the Criticality Index (CI) introduced by
Facchinetti et al. [8] which generates a normalized value I of risk
taking as input the frequency of the values used to measure the
consequence of an unwanted incident. This is, given a categorical
random variable X with ordered categories xk that represent de-
creasing consequence levels k = 1, 2, ...,K , a value of I closer to 0
indicates that the severity of a risk event is likely to be low whereas
values closer to 1 indicate that the severity is likely to be high. An
estimator of the risk index I can be obtained out of a sample of size
n of the categorical variable X with the following equation [8]:
Iˆ =
∑K
k=1 F˜k − 1
K − 1 (1)
where, for a consequence scale of K levels, the values k = 1 and
k = K correspond to the highest and lowest consequence values
of an unwanted incident, respectively. Likewise, F˜k corresponds to
the empirical distribution function of the random variable X , which
for a category xk is computed as the number of observations rl in
the sample with consequence levels between 1 and k :
F˜k =
∑k
l=1
rl
n
for k = 1, 2, ...,K
Eq. 1 aggregates evidence about the consequence of an unwanted
incident to determine the severity of its corresponding risk event.
Consequently, Iˆ can be used to instantiate the Risk component of a
PH, and consequently to generate risk awareness on well-known
patterns of information disclosure in SNSs. Under this premise, we
will describe in the next two sections (i) a method for collecting
evidence of unwanted incidents in SNSs using deleted posts and (ii)
instantiate the Risks of PHs for the later generation of adaptive risk
awareness in SNSs. This second task, which involves the generation
of a confidence interval that contains the real value of I , is addressed
in Section 5.
4 LEARNING FROM DELETED POSTS
As we discussed in Section 3, PHs are promising instruments for
the generation of risk awareness in SNSs. However, in order to put
these instruments into practice, one must properly estimate the
severity of the privacy risks that are associated to them. The CI
discussed in section 3.2 is an adequate instrument to perform such
an estimation; however, this requires empirical evidence about the
frequency of UINs. In order to gather the evidence necessary to
estimate those privacy risks that are associated with PHs we have
defined amethod consisting of five steps:Analyse Post Content, Elicit
Unwanted Incident, Match Existing Heuristics, Add New Heuristic,
and Update Contingency Table. As depicted in Fig. 4, each stage
of the method draws on different external inputs and generates
the outputs for the next step. The final output of the method is an
updated version of a contingency table which is a data structure
used to summarize the frequency of the different UINs that are
associated with a PH.
Step 1: Content Analysis The method starts when a post with
private information is deleted by the user. Basically, an event of
such characteristics is likely to occur when the user has lived a
regrettable experience after disclosing sensitive data to the wrong
audience. Therefore, a deleted post which encloses this type of in-
formation can be used as a vehicle for gathering information about
UINs that result from self-disclosure actions in SNSs. To start with
the identification of private information inside deleted posts, one
must have a taxonomy of attributes of sensitive nature. This is often
a challenge itself due to the multiple definitions of private informa-
tion, and the influence that the context where such information is
disclosed can have for this type of analysis. Consequently, different
taxonomies of private/sensitive attributes have been proposed by
scholars, each of them based on different interpretations of private
information [17]. Since the goal of this step is to identify regret-
table posts, the taxonomy of attributes used for this task should
be aligned with this purpose. Thus, such taxonomy must include
attributes for which there is evidence of regret when they have
been disclosed inside SNSs.
Based on a study of regrets conducted by Wang et al. [23], Díaz
Ferreyra et al. [4] proposed a taxonomy of surveillance attributes
(SAs) that provides an intuitive representation of different aspects
of the users’ private information in SNS. As shown in Table 1, this
taxonomy organizes a collection of personal attributes (i.e. the SAs)
around a number of high-level categories called “self-disclosure
dimensions” which arrange them into demographics, sexual profile,
political attitudes, religious beliefs, health factors and condition, lo-
cation, administrative, contact, and sentiment. We will adopt this
taxonomy for the identification of private information, meaning
that this step can be summarized as the identification of SAs inside
deleted posts. Taking the example of Fig 2, the SAs disclosed in the
post are work location, employment status together with a negative
sentiment. In principle, these and the rest of the taxonomy’s SAs
could be automatically identified using methods and techniques for
Dimension Surveillance Attributes
Demographics Age, Gender, Nationality, Racial origin, Eth-
nicity, Literacy level, Employment status,
Income level, Family status
Sexual Profile Sexual preference
Political Attitudes Supported party, Political ideology
Religious Beliefs Supported religion
Health Factors
and Condition
Smoking, Alcohol drinking, Drug use,
Chronic diseases, Disabilities, Other health
factors
Location Home location, Work location, Favorite
places, Visited places
Administrative Personal Identification Number
Contact Email address, Phone number
Sentiment Negative, Neutral, Positive
Table 1: The “self-disclosure” dimensions.
Natural Language Processing (NLP) such as regular expressions,
named-entity recognition or deep learning algorithms (e.g. Nguyen-
Son et al. [16] applied support vector machines for the identification
of private information in SNSs). This task goes beyond the scope of
this paper; therefore, we rely on the assumption that this step can
be automated.
Step 2: Elicit Unwanted Incident After identifying a set of
SAs inside the deleted post the next step is to gather information
about the reasons that led the user to delete such content. In other
words, we must (i) confirm that the post was deleted by the user
because its publication led to an UIN, and (ii) if true, determine
which particular UIN took place together with its consequence level.
For this purpose, we have designed the interface of Fig 3, which
is displayed to the user after she deletes a post which contains
SAs. Basically, this interface asks the user if the post being deleted
caused her an unpleasant experience and asks her to provide further
details. Particularly, the user can specify the unwanted incident that
took place using a pre-defined list of UINs (i.e. using the list-box
with the label “Unwanted Incident”) or adding a new item if it is
not in the list (i.e. using the “Other” button). Likewise, the user
can select the audience that should have not seen the post using a
pre-defined list of social circles (i.e. using the list-box with the label
“Unintended Audience”) or adding a new item if it is not in the list
(i.e. using the “Other” button). Finally, the consequence level of the
unwanted incident can be specified using the list-box with the label
“Consequence Level”. Fig. 3 illustrates the report corresponding to
the scenario of Fig. 2 in which the user describes the wake-up call
from her superior as an UIN with a moderate consequence level.
After completing all the fields on the interface, the user can submit
the report on the deleted post by clicking on “Submit”.
Figure 3: Submit Unwanted Incidents Interface
Step 3: Match Existing Heuristics As mentioned in section
3.1, a PHDB is a KB that contains a collection of PHs which repre-
sent different regrettable self-disclosure scenarios. Basically, these
scenarios are patterns that repeat themselves when different posts
with similar information result in the same UIN after reaching the
same social circle (i.e. the same Audience). For instance, a user who
posts “I hate my job at this company but damn, it pays the rent!
#keepcalm” is revealing the same set of SAs like the ones being
revealed in the post of Fig. 2. Moreover, this user can suffer the
same UIN as the user of Fig. 2 if the post is seen by her colleagues
from work. Consequently, the same pattern (i.e. the same PH) can
be extracted from two or more different posts. When this happens,
deleted posts act as evidence of the same UIN and, therefore, can
be used in the estimation of privacy risks.
Figure 4: Update Contingency Table Method
The goal of this step is to identify if the regrettable scenario
elicited in Steps 1 and 2 of the method corresponds to a pre-existing
PHi inside the PHDB. Overall, there are three ways in which a
PHi can match the elicited scenario. The first one is when the SAs,
Audience and UIN associated with PHi are equal to the SAs, Audi-
ence and UIN elicited in Steps 1 and 2 of the method (i.e. PHi .SAs =
post .SAs , PHi .Audience = post .Audience and PHi .U IN = post .U IN ).
For instance, a user reporting job loss after posting “My job at this
company is like the coffee they serve...awful!” is a scenario very sim-
ilar to the one of Fig. 2. Basically, in both cases the same UIN (i.e.
job loss) takes place after disclosing the same set of SAs (i.e. work
location, employment status and a negative sentiment) to the same
Audience (i.e. work colleagues). If we analyse a regrettable scenario
in terms of sufficient and necessary conditions, one can say that
disclosing a set of SAs to a specific Audience is sufficient condition
for an UIN to (eventually) occur (i.e. SAs,Audience ⇒ U IN ). In this
sense, both scenarios have the same sufficient and necessary condi-
tions. Consequently, if the sufficient and necessary conditions of
PHi are equal to the ones of the elicited scenario, then PHi matches
the elicited scenario.
The second matching case occurs when the UIN reported by the
user differs from the one of PHi , but the Audience and SAs stay
equal (i.e. PHi .SAs = post .SAs , PHi .Audience = post .Audience and
PHi .U IN , post .U IN ). Let us consider again the previous example
in which the user compares her workplace with the quality of
her coffee. Let’s imagine for a moment that this time the user
has indicated harassment as the UIN instead of job loss. According
to the matching criterion just introduced, the PHi which models
the scenario of Fig. 2 does not match this new scenario. However,
both scenarios describe the same sufficient conditions (i.e. SAs and
Audience) under which these UINs may take place. Hence, the new
scenario can be modelled just by adding a new UIN (i.e. harassment)
to PHi (as we show in Step 5). Therefore, if only the sufficient
conditions of PHi are equal to the ones of the elicited scenario, then
PHi matches the elicited scenario after adding the elicited UIN to
it.
The third matching case occurs when the SAs extracted in Step 1
of the method are a superset of the ones of PHi but the Audience and
the UIN reported by the user stay equal (i.e. PHi .SAs ⊂ post .SAs ,
PHi .Audience = post .Audience and PHi .U IN = post .U IN ). For
instance, a user reporting job loss after posting “Moving to Boston
was definitely not a good idea...the weather in this town sucks and
so my job at this company! #wrongdecisions” is also a scenario a
very similar to the one of Fig. 2. In both cases the Audience is
work colleagues and the UIN is job loss; however, an additional
SA is disclosed in this new scenario: home location. According to
the matching criteria introduced so far, the PHi which models the
scenario of Fig. 2 does not match the new scenario since their
sufficient conditions are not equal. Nevertheless, the SAs disclosed
in the new scenario are a superset of the ones disclosed in Fig. 2.
This means that, according to PHi , job loss can already occur when
revealing fewer SAs to an audience composed by work colleagues.
In this case, we say that the sufficient conditions of PHi absorb the
ones of the elicited scenario. Therefore, if the sufficient conditions
of PHi absorb the ones of the elicited scenario, then PHi matches
the elicited scenario when the necessary conditions of both stay
equal.
If there is a PH that follows any of the matching criteria previ-
ously described, then it is retrieved from the PHDB and handed
to Step 5. Otherwise, a new PH which represents the regrettable
scenario being reported by the user must be created and added
to the PHDB. This task, which corresponds to the Step 4 of the
method, takes care of generating the corresponding PHi , taking as
input the SAs of the deleted post together with the Audience and
UIN entered by the user. The result in this case is a new PH and,
consequently, an updated version of the PHDB which corresponds
to PHDB* in Fig. 4.
Step 5: Update Contingency Table Regrettable self-disclosure
scenarios can result in more than one UIN. For instance, the sce-
nario of Fig. 2 may result sometimes in job loss and in other cases
in reputation damage, depending on the situation reported by each
user. Likewise, an UIN can be the consequence of different regret-
table scenarios. For instance, disclosing ones’ sexual orientation or
religious beliefs can lead in both cases to unjustified discrimination.
Therefore, a PH can be associated with different UINs, and different
UINs can be associated with more than one PH. Furthermore, some
UINs are likely to occur more often than others. This means that, for
the PH associated with the scenario of Fig. 2, reputation damage can
be reported by the users more frequently than job-loss (or vice versa).
Moreover, certain consequence values of a particular UIN can be
reported more often than others. For instance, reputation damage
can be perceived in most cases as an event of a minor magnitude
and rarely as a catastrophic event. Therefore, some consequence
values may have a higher frequency than others.
A Contingency Table (CT) is a structure which organizes the
information about the frequency of the UINs associated with a PH.
Basically, it is a double-entry table in which each cell describes the
number of times that anU INj has been reported as the consequence
of the scenario modelled by a PHi . This is expressed through a
tuple of five elements representing the frequency of the values
catastrophic, major, moderate, minor and insignificant. For instance,
according to Table 2, the U IN2 has been reported 108 times as
a negative consequence of the scenario modelled by PH1. From
these 108 occurrences, 50 were reported as events of catastrophic
magnitude, 48 as major, and 10 as moderate. The goal of this step is
to update the CT with the information provided by the user in Step
2. Basically, this consists of incrementing by 1 the consequence
value of the UIN reported by the user for the PHs identified in Step
3 (or the PH created in Step 4). For instance, let us assume that
one of the PHs identified was PH1 and the user has reportedU IN2
as the UIN with a moderate consequence level. Then, the output
of this step is an updated version of the CT in which the tuple
that corresponds to the PH1 and U IN2 contains now the values
{50,48,11,0,0}. In the case that a new PH has been created as result
of Step 4 (or the user has specified a new UIN in Step 2), a new
row (or column) of {0,0,0,0,0} corresponding to such PH (or UIN)
must be added to the CT prior to the incrementation of the UIN’s
frequency.
UIN1 UIN2 UIN3
PH1 {0,0,0,0,0} {50,48,10,0,0} {0,0,44,188,90}
PH2 {0,0,0,0,0} {0,0,79,55,0} {0,0,0,0,0}
PH3 {0,0,0,0,0} {0,0,0,0,0} {120,88,7,0,0}
PH4 {300,33,0,0,0} {0,0,0,0,0} {0,0,0,0,0}
PH5 {0,0,0,0,0} {0,310,70,0,0} {0,0,0,0,0}
Table 2: Contingency Table
5 ADAPTIVE AWARENESS GENERATION
Aswementioned previously, PHs represent knowledge on recurrent
self-disclosure scenarios that often lead to regrettable experiences.
Therefore, they can be used to (i) detect potentially regrettable sce-
narios, and (ii) alert on the risks associated with such scenarios. The
method we have just described is an instrument for collecting and
organizing evidence on UINs which are associated with different
PHs. Therefore, the content inside the CT can help us to estimate
and communicate the severity of the different risks that may arise
when disclosing certain patterns of private information in SNSs. In
this section we describe how the information contained inside the
CT can be applied to the generation of adaptive privacy warnings.
Concretely, we introduce an algorithm which computes the severity
of privacy risks associated with the publication of a post and inform
the user about such risks. In order to regulate the frequency of such
interventions, the algorithm incorporates a mechanism based on
the action taken by the user after the warning is triggered (i.e. if
the user publishes or not the post in the end).
5.1 Identify Unwanted Incidents
Algorithm 1 describes a process in which the information inside
the CT is used to communicate the risks associated with a self-
disclosure act. Basically, this consists of the generation of a warning
message wMSG describing the risks that may occur if the user
posts a message with private information. For this, the function
GenerateWarningMSG is invoked when she attempts to share a post
P in a SNS. First, function GetSAs (line 3) analyses the information
disclosed inside P and extracts the SAs from it (i.e. like in Step 1 of
the method introduced in section 4). The result (i.e. a set of SAs)
is assigned to postSAs and used thereafter to compute a set of PHs
which can provide information about potential privacy risks. This
basically consists of collecting those PHs whose SAs are included
in the ones of the post. In other words, PHi is retrieved from the
PHDB when PHi .SAs ⊆ postSAs . This step is performed by the
functionGetPHs and its result then assigned to postPHs (line 4). If
postPHs , ∅, it means that there is evidence about privacy risks
that might occur after the publication of P . That being the case, the
next step is to estimate the severity of such risks and communicate
them to the user.
Algorithm 1 Adaptive awareness pseudo-code
1: function GenerateWarningMSG(Post P )
2: WarninдMSG wMSG;
3: Set<SA> postSAs := GetSAs(P);
4: Set<PH> postPHs := GetPHs(postSAs, PHDB);
5: for each PHi ∈ postPHs do
6: Audience Au := GetAudience(PHi );
7: Set<U IN> postU INs := GetU INs(ContTbl , PHi );
8: for eachU INj ∈ postU INs do
9: ConsFreq F := GetConsFreq(ContTbl , PHi ,U INj );
10: CritIndex Iˆi j := ComputeCritIndex(F );
11: if Iˆi j > φ then
12: wMSG .addRisk(U INj , Au);
13: end if
14: end for
15: end for
16: RaiseWarninд(wMSG);
17: Action usrAction :=WaitForUsrAction();
18: UpdateRiskThreshold(usrAction);
19: end function
In order to estimate the privacy risks of the post, we must first
determine the frequency of those UINs that can take place if the
post is shared. For this, we iterate through each PHi inside postPHs
(line 5) and extract (i) its audience, and (ii) a list of the UINs that
are associated with it (lines 6 and 7). The information about the
audience is extracted by the function GetAudience , assigned to
the variable Au and used later for the generation of the warning
message (line 6). On the other hand, the function GetU INs queries
ContTbl (i.e. the CT) to gather those UINs associated with the PHi
whose frequency is greater than zero. Its outcome (i.e. a set of
UINs) is assigned to postU INs and used thereafter for estimating
the privacy risks of the posts (line 7). Basically, the estimation of the
risks consists of computing the CI of those UINs that are associated
with any of the PHs inside postPHs . For this, we must first iterate
through eachU INj in postU INs (line 8) and obtain the frequency
of its consequence values from the CT (line 9). This is done by
the function GetConsFreq which retrieves from the CT the cell
corresponding to the PHi and the U INj . After its execution, its
outcome is assigned to F and handed to the next step which is the
computation of the CI.
5.2 Compute Criticality Index
The functionComputeCritIndex takes the frequency F ofU INj and
estimates its risk severity (line 10). For this, it uses the approach
described in section 3.2 which consists of computing a CI using
Eq. 1. To illustrate this step, let us assume that the user writes
a post similar to the one in Fig. 1 and the SAs disclosed inside
the post matches the ones of PH1. Let us also assume that the
information inside the CT is the one illustrated in Table 2. Then,
we have two UINs (i.e.U IN2 for job loss andU IN3 for reputation
damage) that are likely to occur if the post is shared by the user. In
order to estimate the risks of this post we apply the Eq. 1 using the
frequency values corresponding toU IN2 andU IN3 for PH1:
Iˆ12 =
( 2554 + 4954 + 1 + 1 + 1) − 1
5 − 1 = 0.843
Iˆ13 =
(0 + 0 + 22161 + 232161 + 1) − 1
5 − 1 = 0.214
The values obtained for Iˆ12 and Iˆ13 correspond to the CI of PH1
for U IN2 and U IN3, respectively. According to these values, the
severity of job loss is higher than the one of reputation damage.
However, as mentioned in section 3.2, these values are an estima-
tion of the CI based on a sample. Consequently, we must build a
confidence interval containing the real parameter I with a certain
confidence level. For this, we must first estimate the variance of Iˆ
according to the following equation:
Var (Iˆ ) = 1
n(K − 1)
[∑K−1
k=1 (K − k)
2pk (1 − pk )
− 2
∑K−1
k=1 (K − k)pk
∑k−1
l=1 (K − l)pl
]
(2)
where n is the size of the sample, K the number of consequence
levels, and pk the proportion of observations in the sample cor-
responding to the category k . Using this equation, a confidence
interval for Iˆ can be obtained as:
Iˆ − Zα/2 · S(Iˆ ) ≤ I ≤ Iˆ + Zα/2 · S(Iˆ ) (3)
where S(Iˆ ) is the standard deviation of Iˆ , α the significance level,
and Zα/2 the standard score for α/2. Consequently, for a signifi-
cance level α = 0.05, the confidence intervals for I12 and I13 are
[0.782; 0.904] and [0.180; 0.249], respectively. Following a conserva-
tive criterion, the outcome of the function ComputeCritIndex will
be the upper bound of the confidence interval created for each UIN.
Therefore, the function will return 0.904 in the case of U IN2, and
0.249 forU IN3.
5.3 Communicate Unwanted Incidents
As mentioned in section 3, not all users are equally concerned about
their privacy. There are users who are willing to expose themselves
more in SNSs and users who rather keep their private information
away from public disclosure. In other words, some users take higher
privacy risks than others when making privacy decisions. In line
with this premise, Algorithm 1 introduces a privacy risk threshold
φ which is used to determine which UINs should (or should not) be
communicated to the user. Basically, it consists of a value between
0 and 1 which is tested against the risk criticality index returned
by ComputeCritIndex. If this value is equal or higher than φ, then
it means that the risk is unacceptable for the user and, therefore,
the corresponding UIN should be communicated. Conversely, if
this value is lower than φ, then the risk is acceptable, and the UIN
should not be informed (line 11). To illustrate this mechanism, let
us assume that φ = 0.5 and the criticality indexes being evaluated
correspond to the ones of Iˆ12 and Iˆ13. Since Iˆ12 = 0.904 > φ, then
U IN2 is added to the body of the warning messagewMSG together
with its corresponding audienceAu (line 12). On the other hand, the
risk criticality index Iˆ13 = 0.249 < φ, hence,U IN3 is not included
in the body of the warning message.
Figure 5: Envisioned Interface
After the content of the warning message has been defined, the
function RaiseWarninд takes over the task of communicating the
message to the user (line 16). This can be done using a pop-up mes-
sage like the one illustrated in Fig. 5. At this point, the user has the
chance to re-think the content of her post or proceed with its pub-
lication. It may happen that after some time the number of rejected
warnings is higher/lower than the number of accepted warnings.
This is, one may observe that, after a time frame τ , the user tends to
ignore (or accept) the warnings and proceed (or not proceed) with
the publication of her posts. In order to regulate the frequency of the
interventions, the value of φ is adjusted at the end of each τ interval
according to the actions taken by the user. Basically, this consists of
decreasing/increasing the value of φ depending on the number of
times the user has accepted/rejected an intervention. For this, the
functionWaitForUsrAction waits for the user’s decision and for-
wards it to the functionUpdateRiskThreshold which takes care of
updating the value of φ (lines 17 and 18). This function keeps track
of the number of times the user has ignored/followed the warnings
within a τ period of time. After each τ period, if #iдnored > #accept ,
then the value of φ is increased in δ (i.e φτ+1 := φτ +δ ). Conversely,
if #iдnored < #accept , then φ is decreased in δ (i.e φτ+1 := φτ − δ ).
6 DISCUSSION
Although our approach is devoid of assumptions related to the
estimation of privacy risks, there are limitations that should be
acknowledged and considered. One of these issues is related to the
identification of SAs inside the users’ post. As we mentioned in sec-
tion 4, there are different NLP methods that could be applied for the
automatic identification of such SAs. However, the use of sarcasm
or irony (which is common inside SNSs) can modify significantly
the meaning of a post and, therefore, hinder its analysis (e.g. a post
could be classified as negative, when in fact it is sarcastic) [11, 12].
Another issue is related to posts which are not self-referential. For
instance, a post like “Working at Google may sound great...but I am
sure that it can be a very competitive and hostile work environment” is
expressing a negative opinion about working for Google, however,
it is not saying that the user who wrote it works for this company.
Therefore, whatever method one defines for the identification of
SAs inside posts, it should be aware of these variations in order to
identify regrettable self-disclosure scenarios in a correct way.
Another aspect to be considered is related to the values that
are assigned to the parameters of Algorithm 1. For instance, one
must assign an initial value to φ which can result in more or less
interventions at the initial phases of the awareness process. For
instance, a value of φ closer to 0 would result in a higher interven-
tion frequency, whereas a value closer to 1 would generate a lower
amount of interventions. In line with this, the value assigned to τ
can impact the values adopted by φ at the adaptation phase. This is,
a small τ would limit the amount of evidence gathered on warning
being accepted/ignored by the user. Hence, the value of φ would
probably not reflect the user’s privacy behaviour. Likewise, a big
τ would result in values of φ that stay invariant for long periods
of time. Consequently, the frequency of the interventions would
not be reactive enough with regard to the user’s privacy decisions.
Both parameters, φ and τ , should be chosen with care in order to
guarantee a sustained awareness support to the user.
Although the awareness system described in this paper stands
for the protection of the users’ privacy, it is ultimately a recom-
mender system. Moreover, it is a system which requires analysing
and processing personal information for shaping its recommenda-
tions. Hence, its benefits come along with the privacy concerns that
are characteristic of recommender systems. That is, issues related
to algorithmic transparency, fairness and trust that can jeopardize
the users’ privacy rights. This calls for a Data Privacy Impact As-
sessment (DPIA) of the different software artefacts and information
flows described throughout this paper (i.e. PHDB, UPDB, post analy-
sis, etc.). The notion of DPIA has been introduced in the EU General
Data Protection Regulation [18] and is basically an assessment that
service providers must conduct in order to identify and minimize
the risks that data processing may bring to the privacy rights of
data subjects (i.e. the users). Although this analysis goes beyond
the scope of this work, it is a critical point that must be taken into
consideration and further elaborated.
7 DESIGN AND EVALUATION PLAN
Evaluating the approach introduced in this paper brings up a series
of challenges related to the technical and human resources that are
necessary for setting up an experimental environment. Basically,
our approach requires input from a large number of users in order to
estimate the risk value of a set of self-disclosure scenarios. Moreover,
enough evidence on each particular scenario inside the PHDB is
necessary to perform such estimation. Hence, one must count not
only on a large number of participants, but these participants should
also provide enough input on each of the PHs stored in the PHDB.
In principle, gathering such extent of user input could be possible
through the development of some SNS plugin that implements the
interface of Fig. 3. However, it would still take some time until
enough information on each PH is collected and, consequently,
until the corresponding risk index could be computed.
One way of gathering the information necessary for the esti-
mation of privacy risks is through an online questionnaire. For
instance, one can propose a questionnaire consisting of a set of
self-disclosure scenarios and ask the participants to rate the severity
level of each of them using an ordinal scale. Each scenario can be
afterwards represented as a PH, and the information collected from
the questionnaires inserted in the CT. By doing this, we simplify the
process of collecting heuristic-related information through deleted
posts and simulate the knowledge extraction process described in
section 3. On the other hand, the process of knowledge application
can be carried forward by implementing the warning system de-
scribed in this paper as a mobile application. That is, an application
from which (i) users can post messages using their SNS accounts
(e.g. via the Facebook or Twitter APIs), and (ii) intervenes following
the approach described in section 5. This app can be used after-
wards in an experiment in which the participants are requested to
install it and use it for a certain time. Thereafter, the effectiveness of
the interventions generated by the app can be evaluated conducting
structured interviews with the participants.
8 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
Risk communication and management is a valuable instrument for
helping the users of SNSs to make better and more informed pri-
vacy decisions. Particularly, incorporating adaptive risk awareness
features into the design of PTs can have a positive impact on their
engagement levels [6]. As we mentioned on section 3, engineering
such adaptive solutions requires the definition of processes related
to knowledge extraction and application. In this work we have
addressed both activities through (i) the definition of a method for
collecting information about UINs and (ii) an algorithm for generat-
ing adaptive interventions. The envisioned interface illustrated on
Fig. 5 shows how these two instruments can work in cooperation in
order to endow SNSs with user-centred privacy awareness features.
Adapting the risk information and frequency of interventions
is a step towards more effective PTs. However, a study of Kaptein
et al. [13] suggest that framing the style of an intervention can
also improve its effectiveness. In their study, persuasive messages
for promoting healthier eating habits were framed using either an
authoritarian-style (e.g. “The World Health Organization advises
not to snack. Snacking is not good for you” ) or a consensus-style
(e.g. “Everybody agrees: not snacking between meals helps you to
stay healthy” ). The outcome of this experiment suggests that per-
suasive messages are more effective when tailored to the user’s
preferred persuasive style. This phenomenon was also observed
in an experiment conducted by Schäwel et al. [21] in which warn-
ing messages were used to promote safer self-disclosure decisions
among the users of SNSs. Particularly, an intervention framed us-
ing an authoritarian-style such as “Rethink what you are going to
provide. Privacy researchers from Harvard University identify such
information as highly sensitive!” can be more effective than another
one framed using a consensus-style like “Everybody agrees: Provid-
ing sensitive information can result in privacy risks!”, and vice versa.
Adapting the persuasive style of interventions is an aspect that will
be further investigated in our future publications.
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